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Ownership Concentration and Expropriation in Chinese IPOs 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the ubiquitous deviation between large shareholders’ control rights 
and cash flow rights by examining ownership concentration and expropriation in the unique 
context of Chinese IPOs. We find that IPO firms whose largest shareholders have control 
rights in excess of their cash flow rights underperform other IPOs by 32% and 26% on 
three-year post-IPO buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 
respectively. These firms also experience greater declines in operating performance post 
IPO, driven partly by the high likelihood of their undertaking value-destroying related party 
transactions. Their first day returns are also significantly lower than those of other IPOs, 
indicating that investors in secondary markets partially anticipate the cost associated with 
excessive control. These findings strongly suggest that in an economy with 
disproportionate ownership structures, minority shareholders in newly listed firms face a 
greater risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
 
Keywords: IPO, Long-run performance, Excess control, Disproportionate ownership 
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1. Introduction 
Not only is the divergence between large shareholders' control rights and cash flow 
rights ubiquitous in firms around the world, but the extant literature also provides evidence 
of its relation to shareholder entrenchment (Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; 
Laeven and Levine 2008), which in turn leads to expropriation of minority shareholders. In 
fact, according to Bae et al. (2012), controlling shareholders’ incentives to expropriate 
minority investors are the key channel through which corporate governance affects firm 
value. Such expropriation is especially relevant in economies with weak legal protection or 
poorer governance standards (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2000), such as in the Chinese context studied here. Although the use of 
excessive control-enhancing mechanisms can reduce performance even in family owned 
firms (Masulis et al. 2011), it is the (under)performance of IPOs that has the most 
important implications for public investors. This paper therefore examines the impact of 
ownership concentration and/or disproportionate equity structure (i.e., a divergence 
between controlling shareholders’ voting and cash flow rights) on the performance of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) in newly listed Chinese firms.  
 Although the pervasive underpricing in both short-run and long-run IPO 
underperformance is amply documented (Ritter, 1984, 1991), little is known about the 
effect of concentrated ownership on long-term IPO performance. Yet the relation between 
these two variables influences the role of retail investors as important providers of external 
financing to newly listed firms. In addition, markets characterized by excessive ownership 
concentration carry a greater risk of expropriation because, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
point out, large owners gain major control of the corporation and prefer private benefits. 
This paper is the first to explicitly examine the performance implications of excess 
control rights in IPO firms by leveraging the unique features of the Chinese market. First, 
as in other emerging markets, China’s corporate governance system and investor protection 
for small shareholders are weak, meaning that the negative entrenchment effects of a 
disproportionate ownership structure are likely to be more pronounced. Second, much 
active investment in Chinese newly listed firms is by small retail investors for whom IPO 
performance is critical. Third, even though the equity market is a critical source of external 
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financing for all non-government owned firms,
1
 the majority of Chinese IPO firms have a 
concentrated ownership structure characterized by divergence between control rights and 
cash flow rights. Our premise is thus that the presence and magnitude of the divergence 
between control and cash flow rights are negatively related to IPO performance. 
Rather, our sample comprises 258 non-state controlled companies in China that went 
public between 2002 and 2008 (51% of all the IPOs in that period), all of whom were 
required to disclose their ultimate owners, making the controlling shareholders’ cash flow 
and control rights traceable. Of these firms, 53% are characterized by a disproportionate 
ownership structure in which the ultimate owners’ control rights exceed their cash flow 
rights. Firms characterized by such excess control significantly underperform both the 
market and other firms in post-IPO stock returns. Specifically, based on three-year 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns (BHR) and cumulative abnormal market-adjusted 
returns (CAR), firms with an ownership wedge underperform those without a wedge by 
almost 32% and 26%, respectively. Excess control rights are also negatively associated 
with operating performance.  
To further understand the channels through which excess control rights lower long-run 
performance, we rule out IPO mispricing as a driver because first day underpricing is 
negatively associated with high excess control rights. This finding suggests that public 
investors anticipate the potential for large shareholders to expropriate wealth and are 
unwilling to pay a higher price for these stocks. Rather, recent studies suggest that when 
corporate wealth can be transferred from listed firms to their controlling shareholders, poor 
performance may be explained by tunneling activities (Peng et al., 2010). We therefore link 
firm performance, related party transactions, and ownership structure to show that the 
frequency of value-destroying related party transactions increases in and is significantly 
higher for firms with excess control rights.    
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature: it is the first to focus 
on the relation between disproportionate ownership structure and IPOs, it documents 
significant entrenchment effects of excess control rights on post-IPO long-term 
                                                             
1
 State owned enterprises have preferential access to credit.  
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performance, and it greatly extends the literature on the relation between corporate 
governance and IPO underpricing in the Chinese stock market.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces our data and sample. Section 4 
analyzes the impact of the divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash flow and control 
rights on long-run performance. Section 5 addresses the effect of the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ excess control rights on the underpricing of non-state controlled IPOs, and 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
 The very first investigation into the divergence between cash flow and control rights 
(La Porta et al., 1999), which covers companies from 27 countries, suggests that controlling 
shareholders can gain control rights in excess of their cash flow claims through a pyramid 
structure and the common practice of ownership concentration. In emerging markets, 
particularly, where concentrated ownership structure is widespread, agency costs are more 
like to originate from a conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Classens 
and colleagues (Classens, Djankov, Fan, et al., 2000), for example, identify a pyramid 
structure and cross shareholding as the major organizational strategy used by firms in nine 
East Asian economies to separate ownership and control. They also provide important 
evidence that entrenchment effects on corporate governance stemming from the divergence 
between cash flow rights and control rights can significantly decrease firm value (Classens, 
Djankov, and Lang, 2002), a claim supported by several later studies (Lemmon and Lins, 
2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Gompers et al., 2010).  
Fan et al. (2011) show that the cost of expropriation is ultimately born by a controlling 
owner who must then devote substantial resources to mitigate the cost, while other 
researchers identify several channels through which large shareholders tunnel benefits. 
Cheung et al.’s (2006) analysis of related party transactions between Hong Kong listed 
companies and their controlling shareholders, for instance, associates these transactions 
with the wealth losses of minority shareholders. Likewise, Peng et al. (2010) provide 
evidence that in Chinese listed firms whose financial condition is sound, controlling 
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shareholders use related party transactions to extract private benefits from minority 
shareholders.   
In general, the literature on IPO performance documents two phenomena relevant for 
shareholders: pervasive short-run underpricing of IPOs across markets and time periods 
and long-run IPO underperformance of the market in the long term, usually over three- or 
five-year periods (Ritter, 1991). Jain and Kini (1994), for example, find that new IPOs 
experience declines in operating performance post issuance. For China, Chan et al. (2004) 
document both underpricing and long-run underperformance, while Sun and Tong (2003) 
show that post-issue performance is negatively related to state ownership but positively 
related to legal-entity ownership. Wang (2005) also documents a sharp decline in post-IPO 
operating performance but argues that neither state ownership nor ownership concentration 
is related to performance. A negative relation between a disproportionate ownership 
structure and the initial return of IPOs is identified by Yeh et al. (2008), but their study 
focuses on the Taiwanese market only.  
All these studies, however, despite being focused on ownership’s effect on IPO 
performance, fail to explore the implication of the first-order agency problems that arise 
from ownership concentration; that is, the conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders. In the context of a disproportionate ownership economy, controlling 
shareholders are likely to have perverse incentives because of an excess of control rights. If 
the result is expropriation, it should be evident in IPOs. We therefore fill this research void 
by linking IPO performance to disproportionate ownership structure in newly listed firms. 
 The agency problem of disproportionate ownership structure results from conflicts of 
interest. Most particularly, through a pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding, 
controlling shareholders can exert control in excess of their cash flow rights, an imbalance 
that also makes them less subject to board governance and market discipline. Such 
entrenched controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders or outside investors through such activities as related 
party transactions or connected party transactions in which corporate wealth can be 
expropriated through tunneling (Faccio et al., 2001). Fan and Wong (2002) show that in 
East Asian corporations, the earnings-return relation decreases with the level of controlling 
7 
 
shareholders’ excess control rights. 
In the past three decades, China has undergone a profound institutional reform that has 
transformed its economic system from a central planning economy to a fairly decentralized 
market economy in which almost two-thirds of the nation’s GDP is produced by the private 
sector (China Annuals of Statistics, 2009). Since the opening of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in December 1990 and July 
1991, respectively, China’s stock market has developed rapidly. In the early years, the 
majority of Chinese listed companies were former state owned enterprises (SOEs); 
however, since then the number of IPOs with non-state ownership has increased gradually 
through share issue privatization. Between 2002 and 2007, for example, the proportion of 
non-state controlled listed firms among all publicly listed companies in China increased 
from 18% to 67%. Because SOEs have unique institutional features (e.g., fulfilling public 
policy objectives for employment or GPD growth; Putterman and Dong, 2000), however, 
they are excluded from this study. 
  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample 
 Our sample comprises all companies (excluding SOEs) that launched IPOs on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2008. We 
restrict our observations to these years because the reporting of cash flow and control rights 
has only been mandated in China since 2002, and our long-term performance analysis 
requires at least three years of post-issue data, necessitating the inclusion of companies that 
went public prior to December 2008. We also exclude financial firms because of their 
unique accounting standards, and firms with incomplete pre- or post-issue financial 
information. Our final sample consists of 258 firms that launched IPOs during the 
2002–2008 period. We compile our dataset by merging IPO firm characteristics, market 
performance, financial information, and ownership data from the Chinese Stock Market 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database with related party transactions information from 
the RESSET database. 
3.2. Data 
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3.2.1. Long-term IPO performance  
 We evaluate the post-IPO performance of the non-state controlled firms in our sample 
using both market- and accounting-based measures. Our market-based performance 
measures are the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) and the cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock 
returns (CAR). We calculate our results on the basis of monthly stock returns starting from 
the first month after the IPO date. 
We compute the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) as follows: 
 
where Rit is the buy-and-hold return of stock i from month 1 to month t, and rit is the 
monthly raw return of the stock, and 
 
where Rmt is the buy-and-hold return of the market portfolio from month 1 to month t, and 
rmt is the monthly market return, computed as the value weighted returns of all stocks 
traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
The buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (BHR) is thus 
 
and the cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CAR) is 
 
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i at month t, rit is the monthly raw return of the 
stock, and rmt is the monthly market return, computed as the value weighted returns of all 
common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges. The cumulative 
abnormal market-adjusted return (CAR) from event month 1 to month t is thus 
 
To validate our value weighted returns of all common stocks traded on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we use them as adjustments in our analyses of market-based 
performance measures: our regression results remain qualitatively similar to those using 
9 
 
equally weighted indexes. 
We also evaluate firm performance using accounting-based measures, which, however, 
raises the issue of all Chinese pre-IPO accounting data being subject to accounting 
manipulation to fulfill listing requirements (Aharony et al., 2000). Such manipulation can 
create a downward bias in the accounting performance change measures, a bias that we 
take into account by weighting the results based on stock return measures more heavily 
than those based on accounting return measures. For our analysis, we adopt three 
industry-adjusted
2
 accounting performance measures: sales growth, earnings growth, and 
the change in return on sales (ROS), calculated as the difference between the firm-specific 
and industry-median value of performance measure. We use ROS, calculated as net income 
divided by sales, rather than ROA or ROE because Fan et al. (2007) argue that measures 
based on equity or assets might create a downward bias on Chinese post-IPO firm 
performance.
3
 Likewise, because prior studies on post-IPO performance typically compare 
accounting performance changes a few years before and a few years after listing 
(Megginson et al., 1994; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Wang, 2005), we use a firm’s 
pre-IPO accounting figures as a benchmark for evaluating its post-IPO performance. We 
compute the change in ROS by subtracting the average ROS in the three years immediately 
prior to the IPO from the average of the three years of annual ROS after the IPO. The 
earnings (sales) growth measure is the percentage change in the average level of earnings 
(sales) over the three years immediately prior to the IPO to three years after the IPO. It 
should be noted, however, that we have omitted the accounting numbers in the IPO year 
because these data tend to be heavily manipulated (Fan et al., 2007). 
3.2.2. Underpricing of IPO issues 
We calculate the underpricing of an IPO issue as the return on the first day of trading 
(relative to the offering price): 
 
where Reti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i, Pi0 is the closing price of stock i 
                                                             
2 We employ the six-industry classifications borrowed from Firth et al. (2006): finance, industrial, commercial, public 
utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). 
3 See Fan et al. (2007) for more details. 
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on the first trading day, and Pil is the offering price of stock i. 
The market return on the first trading day of the new stock is  
 
where Retim is the market return on the first trading day of the new stock i, Pi,m0 is the 
closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index that corresponds to 
the offering day of the new stock i, and Pi,ml is the closing price of the appropriate Shanghai 
or Shenzhen composite index on the first trading day of the new stock i . 
We adjust the return for the market effect as follows: 
 
where AdjReti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i. 
3.2.3. Ownership type, cash flow rights, and control rights 
To examine the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure, we first identify the 
ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing the chain of ownership. Consistent with 
previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002), we define control rights as 
the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as the product of ownership stakes along 
the chain. To illustrate, if an ultimately controlling shareholder owns 70% of the stock of 
publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 35% of the stock of firm B, then the ultimately 
controlling shareholder controls 35% of firm C, the weakest link in the control rights chain, 
and has cash flow rights of 24.5%, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. 
Because of a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and dual-class stocks, the largest 
shareholders’ control rights are always in excess of its cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 
1999), and because controlling shareholders’ control rights exceed their cash flow rights, 
they always have the incentive and opportunity to expropriate the wealth of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in further tests, we support our main 
hypothesis by replacing cash flow rights with excess control rights, defined as the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 provides a description of the sample. As Panel A clearly shows, the IPO firms 
are unevenly distributed across the sample period, which largely reflects the overall IPO 
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pattern in China. From 2002 to 2006, the Chinese stock market experienced a serious bear 
market in which the Shanghai Stock Index dropped from 2,200 in mid-2001 to 1,050 in 
mid-2005, and only a few firms (e.g., eight in 2005) were willing to go public. Panel A also 
reveals that an average 53.49% of the sample firms have a disproportionate ownership 
structure, with the highest percentage occurring in 2005, when all the IPO firms had such a 
structure, and the lowest (40.91%) occurring in 2003. In the remaining years, the 
percentages fluctuate from 43.10% to 63.27%. The presence of a disproportionate 
ownership structure also varies across industries: the highest percentage occurs in the 
property and real estate and commercial sectors (62.50% and 58.71), followed by the 
conglomerate sector (55.00%), the industrial sector (52.63%), and the public utilities sector 
(50.00%). 
Panel B reports firm characteristics at the time of the IPO. With a mean initial return of 
126.20%, the average levels of underpricing are lower than those reported in earlier 
research (Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the 
underpricing of IPOs in China is still much higher than that in developed markets 
(Loughran et al., 1994):
4
 the mean (median) number of shares issued (in millions) is 34.08 
(28) and the mean (median) issue price of the IPOs is 10.83 (10.04) RMB. Panel B also 
shows average cash flow rights of 32.15% as compared to excess control rights of 7.48%, 
which indicates a clear divergence between the largest shareholders’ control rights and their 
cash flow rights in non-state controlled IPOs firms. 
Panel C reports the mean and median values of the stock-based and accounting-based 
performance measures for the sample. It clearly shows that the average BHR and CAR of 
newly listed non-state controlled firms in China fall initially and then increase in the three 
years subsequent to their IPOs, although the median BHR of these firms remains negative. 
As regards the accounting-based measures, the post-IPO sales and earnings growth 
measures are quite substantial, averaging 124.37% for sales and 32.75% for earnings 
relative to the pre-IPO period. However, the mean (median) change in the three-year 
average ROS of the sample is a negative -11.94% (-8.39%), reflecting a decline in Chinese 
IPO firms’ accounting performance that is consistent with the data reported by Aharony et 
                                                             
4
 Please visit Jay Ritter’s website at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/interntl.htm for the most recently updated information. 
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al. (2000) and Sun and Tong (2003). 
 
4. Disproportionate ownership structure and long-term firm performance  
In this section, we investigate how the disproportionate ownership structure of 
non-state controlled IPO firms affects their long-term market-based performance and 
accounting-based performance. 
4.1. Univariate tests 
 Figures 1 and 2 plot the mean BHRs and CARs, respectively, of non-state controlled 
IPOs firms in China sorted by whether or not the largest shareholders have excess control 
rights. In figure 1, the mean BHR of the group of IPOs firms with excess control remain 
negative over the three years, while the mean BHR of the group of IPOs firms without 
excess control exhibits as large an increase as 30% in later years. Likewise, in figure 2, the 
mean CAR of IPOs firms without excess control rises much more steeply than that of IPOs 
firms with excess control.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of the market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures for two subsamples sorted by whether or not the firms are 
characterized by excess control rights. In each of the three post-IPO years, the mean and 
median BHRs and CARs of firms with excess shareholder control rights are statistically 
significantly lower than those for firms without (except for the 36-month BHRs after IPO, 
whose results are not significant). This finding indicates that the post-IPO market can 
indeed distinguish between the two groups of firms. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
difference in average BHRs and CARs between the two groups grows larger over time, 
suggesting that over the years, the market gradually perceives the negative effects of 
entrenchment. Our between-group comparison of accounting-based performance measures 
further shows that firms with excess control rights experience a more substantial drop in 
average ROS and slower sales and earnings growth than do their counterparts without 
excess control rights. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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4.2. Regressions 
To examine the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on non-state controlled 
firms’ post-IPO performance, we perform regression analyses using generalized least 
squares to control for sample heterogeneity. Tables 3 and 4 summarize our regression 
results using the 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHRs and CARs as dependent variables. The 
regressions also include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), 
the degree of excess control (Ex_wedge), and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the 
wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights 
is larger than zero. The control variables are the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of 
total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies to control for the effect of year 
and industry factors. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Consistent with the univariate results reported in table 2, the multivariate regression 
results show that firms with a disproportionate ownership structure experience a more 
statistically significant stock performance decline after the IPO. The magnitude of the 
differences in BHR and CAR between these two subsamples is also similar to the 
univariate results even after we control for firm-specific factors that could affect post-IPO 
stock return performance. As shown in table 3, firms with a disproportionate ownership 
structure underperform those without in BHR by 9.02% 12 months post IPO, 8.27% 24 
months post IPO, and 4.93% 36 months post IPO, although the effect is not significant for 
the 24-month and 36-month post-IPO periods. In fact, every one percentage increase in 
excess control rights results in a 0.55% (0.68%, 0.77%) decrease in BHRs 12 months (24 
months, 36 months) post IPO, although this decrease is not significant for the 36-month 
post-IPO period. Likewise, as shown in table 4, firms with a disproportionate ownership 
structure significantly underperform those without in CAR by 8.73% 12 months post IPO, 
15.44% 24 months post IPO, and 13.63% 36 months post IPO. Again, every one percentage 
increase in excess control rights results in a significant 0.62% (1.04%, 1.16%) decrease in 
CAR 12 months (24 months, 36 months) after the IPO. 
14 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 reports the results of our regressions analyzing the effects of a disproportionate 
ownership structure on changes in post-IPO accounting performance, with the change in 
ROS, sales growth, and earnings growth as the dependent variables. The independent 
variables are the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of 
excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) for excess control rights, the 
debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal 
to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry 
dummies to control for the effect of year and industry factors. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 The regression results indicate that firms with a disproportionate ownership structure 
experience deteriorating accounting performance subsequent to their IPOs regardless of 
whether performance is measured by the change in ROS, sales growth, or earnings growth. 
The difference in the accounting variable is around -3.67% for the change in ROS, -27.07% 
for sales growth, and -48.56% for earnings growth, and every one percentage increase in 
excess control rights results in a 0.24% decline for the change in ROS, a 3.66% slower 
sales growth, and 3.43% slower earnings growth. These results are consistent with the 
univariate results reported in table 2. 
According to Aharony et al. (2000), in managing their earnings, Chinese firms typically 
manipulate accruals and profits from non-core operations. Therefore, to check the 
robustness of our results and to bring our accounting-based measures more in line with 
those of previous studies, we also use operating earnings/assets, operating earnings growth, 
and net income growth as accounting-based performance measures to test the relation 
between a disproportionate ownership structure and performance changes. As table 6 
indicates, even using these alternative post-IPO accounting performance changes, the level 
of excess control rights remains negatively correlated with firms’ accounting performance 
subsequent to the IPO. More specifically, firms whose ultimately controlling shareholders 
have more excess control rights experience a greater drop in operating earnings/assets and 
slower operating earnings growth and net income growth. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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Taken together, the regression results in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 suggest that non-state 
controlled firms in China that have issued IPOs generally show poorer stock returns and 
accounting performance when the ultimately controlling shareholders can exert control 
through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding using control rights that are in excess 
of cash flow rights. 
4.3 Calendar-time analysis 
The above findings raise another important issue: whether IPOs without excess control 
who outperform IPOs with excess control also outperform the market. To answer this 
question, we perform an additional analysis of the returns of non-state controlled IPO firms 
using calendar time. Specifically, we compile portfolios by including firms that went public 
within the 36-month period and then both equally weight the observations and value weight 
them based on the first trading day’s market capitalization for each company. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
As table 7 shows, the equally weighted portfolios of IPO firms with excess control 
show monthly excess returns relative to the equally weighted market index for the 
Shanghai (A share market) and Shenzhen exchanges (A share market and Growth 
Enterprise Market) of -0.56%. Relative to the value weighted market index of -0.21%, 
however, neither firms with excess control nor those without differ statistically from zero. 
Also on a monthly basis, the IPOs firms without excess control on average underperform 
both the value and equally weighted market index by -0.37 and -0.01, respectively. Using 
the value weighted calendar-time portfolios, however, both IPOs with and without excess 
control underperform the value and equally weighted market indexes, although relative to 
the market, the underperformance is not significantly different from zero. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 8 reports the results of a calendar-time regression analysis using monthly 
portfolios of non-state controlled IPOs with and without excess control compiled by 
including all issues undertaken in the 36 months prior to the month of observation. We run 
both CAPM and Fama and French (1993) regressions, using the monthly returns of these 
portfolios between January 2002 and December 2008 as the dependent variable. Consistent 
with the univariate tests, we find that both equally and value weighted IPOs with excess 
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control underperform the market, with alphas of about -0.16% (CAPM) and -0.27% (Fama 
and French) for equally weighted and -0.28% and -0.30% for value weighted IPOs with 
excess control calendar-time portfolios, respectively. In neither set of regressions are the 
alphas statistically different from zero, and the alphas for the equally weighted IPOs 
without excess control, although positive, are insignificant. Nor does the value weighted 
portfolio of IPOs without excess control differ significantly from the market. Whereas all 
non-state controlled IPOs show positive exposure to firm size (the SMB factor) with SMB 
coefficients that are positive and significantly different from zero at both the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance, the book-to-market (HML factor) coefficients are not significant. 
Overall, therefore, these results indicate that although IPOs with excess control 
underperform IPOs without excess control, neither type performs differently from the 
market. 
4.4 Disproportionate ownership structure and related party transactions 
On the assumption that controlling shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders 
by tunneling the wealth of listed firms, we now explore whether a firm with 
disproportionate ownership structure is more likely to conduct tunneling activities. Using 
related party transactions as proxies, we measure the effect of the wedges between cash 
flow rights and control rights on the probability of a firm undertaking tunneling 
transactions using the likelihood of a firm undertaking a value-destroying related party 
transaction as the dependent variable. Because there is no accurate measure of exactly how 
much benefit is transferred through these transactions, as in prior studies (Cheung et al., 
2006, 2009), we use the market reaction to related party transaction announcements as a 
proxy. A negative market reaction indicates tunneling, which reduces firm value and goes 
against the interests of minority shareholders. We define value-destroying related party 
transactions as any connected transaction associated with negative cumulative abnormal 
market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) over trading day windows 
[0,+1],[-1,+1],[-2,+2],[-2,+5] relative to the announcement day (day 0). The independent 
variables are the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of 
excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) for excess control rights, the 
debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal 
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to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry 
dummies to control for the effect of year and industry factors. We report the estimates of 
our logistic models in table 9. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
As the table clearly shows, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure are more 
likely to engage in value-destroying related party transactions, and the likelihood of a 
firm’s engaging in such transactions increases with the divergence between cash flow rights 
and control rights. Moreover, consistent with Cheung et al.’s (2006) findings, the cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders and firm size are negatively related to value-destroying 
related party transactions. Overall, the evidence in table 9 indicates a positive relation 
between disproportionate ownership and the likelihood of controlling shareholders 
expropriating minority shareholders. This relation is stronger for IPO firms with a wider 
wedge between controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights. This evidence 
further indicates that, in long-term, the underperformance of IPOs with excess control 
rights relative to IPOs without excess control rights is partly driven by their higher 
likelihood of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. 
 
5. Disproportionate ownership structure and initial IPO returns  
This section examines how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state 
controlled IPO firms affects initial IPO returns (underpricing). Table 10 reports the mean 
and median market-adjusted initial stock returns for our sample, sorted by controlling 
shareholders’ excess control rights and year. As the table shows, in most years, firms with a 
disproportionate ownership structure show smaller initial returns than firms without, a 
difference in mean (median) market-adjusted initial return of 112.53% versus 140.89% 
(88.24 versus 101.70), which is significant at the 5% (10%) level. These results support our 
hypothesis that the largest controlling shareholders’ excess control rights have a negative 
impact on the initial returns of non-state controlled IPO firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
To distinguish the effect of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial returns 
of non-state controlled firms, we also perform a regression analysis that controls for 
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additional firm, industry, year, and institutional factors in China’s IPO markets. The 
dependent variable in this model is the IPO’s initial stock return, including both the 
unadjusted initial return (FirstDayReturn) and the market-adjusted return 
(AdjustedFirstDayReturn). Our key independent variables are the degree of the excess control 
rights (Ex_wedge) and a dummy (Ex_dummy) for the largest shareholders having excess 
control rights. As in table 9, when we include the key independents and only control for 
year and industry factors, the estimated coefficients are significantly negative at the 1% 
level for the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and at the 10% level for the 
presence of largest shareholders’ excess control rights (Ex_dummy). 
We then run further regressions that include additional control variables suggested by 
prior research on IPO underpricing. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), for example, suggest 
that underpricing can be affected by the time gap between the offering and the listing. That 
is, because the information known by issuers, underwriters, and investors is asymmetrical 
(Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986), the longer the time lag between the offering and the listing, the 
higher the risk to investors and thus the greater the probability of underpricing. In fact, both 
Chan et al. (2004) and Su (2004) provide empirical evidence that IPO underpricing in 
China is positively related to the offering-to-listing time lag. To capture the effects of this 
information asymmetry, we include the natural logarithm of the number of days between 
the offering and listing dates (LnDays), together with other variables commonly used in 
related studies of Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004; Chen et al., 
2004). These latter, used here as independent variables, include the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash); the age of the firms(LnAge), represented by the 
natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was 
first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year); the issue size (LnIssueSize), 
represented by the natural logarithm of the number of shares issued; and a dummy 
(Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of these multiple regressions, shown in table 11, indicate that the time lag 
between the IPO date and the first trading date is insignificant in explaining IPO 
underpricing. Although this result contrasts with those of earlier studies (Mok and Hui, 
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1998; Su and Fleisher,1999; Chen et al.,2004), it is consistent with more recent findings 
that the time lag in the Chinese IPO market has been dramatically shortened, thereby 
removing previously unknown factors caused by the long time lag (Yu and Tse, 2006). The 
coefficients for the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and the dummy variable 
(Ex_dummy) remain negative, the second significantly so at the 10% (5%) level. The 
marginally lower initial return, or smaller underpricing, associated with a disproportionate 
ownership structure is consistent with our second hypothesis that, in non-state controlled 
IPO firms, the excess control rights enjoyed by ultimately controlling shareholders become 
entrenched in a disproportionate ownership structure, thereby giving largest controlling 
shareholders less incentive to underprice new issues. These results, which support our 
second hypothesis, are also consistent with Yeh et al.’s (2008) findings for Taiwan. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Public investors invest in IPOs because they believe in the issuing firms’ future 
prospects, financial performance, and corporate governance. In China, the world’s largest 
emerging economy, although the IPO market is actively attracting critical financing from 
retail investors, the long-run IPO performance is proving dismal. Many newly listed firms 
are essentially controlled by private owners through a complex pyramid ownership 
structure, which gives controlling shareholders control rights in excess of their cash flow 
rights. Under this concentrated and disproportionate ownership structure, controlling 
shareholders are incentivized to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Our results clearly link Chinese IPO firms characterized by an ownership wedge of 
excess control rights with long-run IPO returns that are significantly poorer than those of 
IPOs without a control wedge. In particular, the market- and accounting-based performance 
of IPO firms with excess shareholder control rights is significantly worse than their 
counterparts with a one-share/one-vote structure. Our findings thus suggest that the conflict 
between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders remains the primary 
agency problem because of the significant entrenchment effect generated by excessive 
control rights. 
This research has important implications for both investors and regulators. First, small 
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public investors interested in IPOs must understand the ownership structure of the newly 
listed firm and rationally discount the price of such firms commensurate with the adverse 
incentives of controlling shareholders. Regulators, for their part, must recognize that the 
corporate governance system has yet to address the challenge of protecting minority 
investors in corporations characterized by a complex and disproportionate ownership 
structure. In fact, such a structure often facilitates expropriation by controlling 
shareholders.  
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Table 1: Sample and Variables Summary statistics  
 
This table presents summary information on the sample of non-state controlled IPO firms in China. 
Panel A reports the sample by year of IPO and by industry sector. Panel B lists the IPO firm 
characteristics, includeing initial return, market-adjusted initial return, firm age, issue size (i.e., the 
number of shares issued in millions), the number of days between the offering and listing dates, the 
listing date issue (ordering) price, the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, and the level 
of excess control rights (i.e., the difference between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow 
rights and control rights). Panel C reports statistics for the two market-based performance measures of 
non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2008 and for the accounting-based 
performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2007 (for 
which we need 3 years of accounting data prior to the IPO and 3 years of accounting data after the IPO). 
The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns (BHRs) and the 
cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months starting from 
one month after the IPO month. We calculate the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjust stock 
returns, and compute the market returns as the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the 
Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. The accounting return measures are the change in return on 
sales (ROS), sales growth, and earnings growth. The change in ROS is measured as the difference 
between the average annual ROS for the three years after the IPO and that for the three years before the 
IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. The sales (earnings) growth variables are the growth 
rates of sales (earnings) from the average annual sales (earnings) in the three years before the IPO year 
to that in the three years after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of firms by IPO year and industry 
 
IPO year Firms with  
excess control 
Firm without 
excess control 
Total Percentage of 
IPOs with excess 
control 
2002 6 6 12 50.00 
2003 9 13 22 40.91 
2004 31 18 49 63.27 
2005 8 0 8 100.00 
2006 20 14 34 58.82 
2007 39 36 75 52.00 
2008 25 33 58 43.10 
      
Public utilities 12 12 24 50.00 
Real estate 5 3 8 62.50 
Conglomerate 5 5 10 55.00  
Industrial 110 99 209 52.63  
Commercial 6 1 7 58.71  
      
Total 138 120 258 53.49 
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Panel B: Characteristics of IPO firms 
      
 Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. 
Initial return (%) 126.20  92.50  -9.00  538.12  101.71  
Market-adjusted initial 
return (%) 
125.72  90.70  -5.72  525.75  100.49  
Firm age (Years) 5.86  5.00  2.00  21.00  3.01  
Issue size (in millions)  34.08  28.00  12.50  210.00  21.03  
Days elapsed between 
offering and listing  
15.38  15.50  9.00  25.00  3.44  
Offer price  10.83  10.04  2.60  36.00  5.01  
Cash flow rights (%) 32.15  30.16  0.00  78.18  15.94  
Excess control rights 
(%)  
7.48  1.82  0.00  34.66  9.28  
 
Panel C: Market-based performance and accounting-based performance 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. Obs. 
BHR 12 months after 
IPO (%) 
-18.64 -8.19 -272.39 284.59 71.26 258 
BHR 24 months after 
IPO (%) 
0.82 -6.49 -372.65 462.05 89.29 258 
BHR 36 months after 
IPO (%) 
8.26 -5.24 -388.87 2186.91 209.65 244 
 
CAR 12 months after 
IPO (%) 
-6.45 -7.25 -130.61 130.58 46.19 258 
CAR 24 months after 
IPO (%) 
6.32 5.80 -116.44 166.46 56.30 
258 
CAR 36 months after 
IPO (%) 
13.88 13.18 -133.60 208.30 67.52 244 
 
Change in ROS (%) -11.94 -8.39 -811.43 55.71 68.75 200 
Growth in sales (%) 124.37 82.87 -152.23 1693.90 196.61 200 
Growth in earnings 
(%) 
32.75 27.73 -788.55 1098.69 194.48 200 
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Table 2: Mean and median statistics of post-IPO performance measures 
 
This table presents the mean and median values for market-based performance measures of non-state 
controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2008 and for the accounting-based performance 
measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2007. The firms are sorted 
by whether or not the ultimately controlling shareholders have cash flow rights in excess of their control 
rights. The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns (BHRs) 
and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months 
starting from one month after the IPO month. We calculate the CARs measure based on monthly 
market-adjusted stock returns and compute market returns as the weighted returns for all common stocks 
traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. We use 258 firms to compute the BHRs and 
CARs for 12 and 24 months and 244 firms to compute the BHRs and CARs for 36 months. The 
accounting return measures are the change in return on sales (ROS), sales growth, and earnings growth. 
The change in ROS is measured as the difference between the average annual ROS for the three years 
after the IPO and that for the three years before the IPO year, adjusted by the specific-industry median. 
The sales (earnings) growth variables are the growth rates of sales (earnings) from the average annual 
sales (earnings) in the three years before the IPO year to that in the three years after the IPO year, 
adjusted by the specific industry median. We use a total of 200 firms to compute the change in ROS, 
sales growth, and earnings growth. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Obs
. 
 With excess 
control 
Without excess  
control 
Difference p-value of mean 
(median)  
difference 
BHR 12 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -24.08 -12.39 -11.69* 0.0947 
0.0045 Median -12.92 -0.38 -12.54*** 
BHR 24 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -12.87 16.57 -29.44*** 0.004 
0.002 Median -17.04 9.43 -26.47*** 
BHR 36 month after IPO 
(%) 
244 
Mean -6.52 25.70 -32.22 0.116 
0.009 Median -17.62 8.49 -26.11*** 
CAR 12 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -13.44 1.59 -15.03*** 0.004 
0.002 Median -20.17 6.08 -26.24*** 
CAR 24 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -4.49 18.76 -23.25*** 0.000 
0.000 Median -9.29 22.98 -32.27*** 
CAR 36 months after IPO 
(%) 
244 
Mean 1.92 27.99 -26.08*** 0.001 
0.003 Median 2.08 24.03 -21.95*** 
Change in  
ROS (%) 
200 
Mean -15.37 -7.48 -7.88 0.211 
0.808 Median -5.87 -8.43 2.57 
27 
 
Growth in  
sales (%) 
200 
Mean 119.64 130.53 -10.89 0.350 
0.233 Median 69.29 98.06 -28.77 
Growth in earnings (%) 200 
Mean 16.51 53.85 -37.33* 0.089 
0.151 Median 9.11 56.67 -47.56 
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Table 3: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (BHRs)  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as the accumulated BHRs 
for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO month. The BHR measures are 
calculated based on monthly market-adjusted stock returns; market returns are computed as the value 
weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. The 
independent variables, measured at IPO year, include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow 
rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one 
if the wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger 
than zero. Also included are the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a 
dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year 
and industry dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHR 12 months after IPO BHR 24 months after IPO BHR 36 months after IPO 
Const -99.663 -104.640 38.142 80.852 391.199** 450.645** 
 (0.247) (0.201) (0.720) (0.454) (0.039) (0.015) 
Cash 0.125 0.254* 0.249 0.352 0.055 0.137 
 (0.453) (0.089) (0.249) (0.101) (0.892) (0.710) 
Ex_wedge -0.548*  -0.680**  -0.773  
 (0.058)  (0.029)  (0.194)  
Ex_dummy  -9.018**  -8.271  -4.931 
  (0.046)  (0.161)  (0.657) 
LnAsset 4.960 5.087 -2.744 -5.097 -19.934** -23.361** 
 (0.255) (0.216) (0.621) (0.363) (0.040) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.054 -0.007 0.008 -0.011 0.021 
 (0.939) (0.275) (0.920) (0.917) (0.930) (0.860) 
Exchange 25.805*** 29.161*** 3.339 1.731 -9.132 -20.905 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.856) (0.928) (0.875) (0.703) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 258 258 258 258 244 244 
Adj. R
2
 0.256 0.250 0.339 0.301 0.283 0.250 
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Table 4: GLS regression results of the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (CARs)   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as the market-adjusted 
stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO 
month. The CAR measures are calculated based on monthly market-adjusted stock returns; market 
returns are computed as the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock exchanges. The independent variables, measured at the year of the IPO, include the 
ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights 
(Ex_wedge), and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger than zero. Also included are the debt-to-sales 
ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR 12 months after IPO CAR 24 months after IPO CAR 36 months after IPO 
Const -45.113 -46.644 -90.984 -2.312 238.746* 281.776** 
 (0.583) (0.577) (0.400) (0.983) (0.062) (0.029) 
Cash 0.139 0.203 0.176 0.330 -0.207 -0.116 
 (0.405) (0.200) (0.406) (0.101) (0.402) (0.627) 
Ex_wedge -0.620**  -1.037***  -1.162***  
 (0.026)  (0.003)  (0.007)  
Ex_dummy  -8.734*  -15.437***  -13.627* 
  (0.070)  (0.009)  (0.078) 
LnAsset 2.486 2.168 3.830 -0.979 -12.559* -15.083** 
 (0.551) (0.607) (0.484) (0.856) (0.051) (0.020) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.080 -0.192*** -0.107 -0.008 0.025 
 (0.278) (0.160) (0.007) (0.143) (0.910) (0.736) 
Exchange 29.187*** 28.945*** 3.942 1.751 -15.111 -17.457 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.731) (0.880) (0.410) (0.364) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 258 258 258 258 244 244 
Adj. R
2
 0.311 0.300 0.304 0.299 0.313 0.305 
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Table 5: GLS regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, change in ROS, sales growth, and earnings 
growth. The change in ROS variable is measured as the difference between the average annual ROS 
three years post IPO year and that of the three years before the IPO year, adjusted by the specific 
industry median. The sales (earnings) growth variables are the growth rates of sales (earnings) from 
the average annual sales (earnings) in the three years before the IPO year to that in the three years 
after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. The independent variables, measured at 
the year of the IPO, include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the 
degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge 
between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger than 
zero, the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) 
equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry 
dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
       
    
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in ROS Growth in sales Growth in earnings 
Const -0.784 -0.268 -9.756*** -8.958** -12.455*** -12.663*** 
 (0.982) (0.994) (0.004) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash -0.023 -0.047 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.734) (0.461) (0.412) (0.451) (0.941) (0.644) 
Ex_wedge -0.216*  -0.037***  -0.033***  
 (0.068)  (0.000)  (0.005)  
Ex_dummy  -3.863**  -0.271  -0.501** 
  (0.037)  (0.129)  (0.017) 
LnAsset 2.004 2.142 0.561*** 0.477*** 0.698*** 0.701*** 
 (0.251) (0.217) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.081** -0.003 -0.002 -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.116) (0.032) (0.393) (0.560) (0.002) (0.000) 
Exchange 13.753 19.040 0.570 0.552 1.441*** 1.284*** 
 (0.260) (0.186) (0.150) (0.156) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Adj. R
2
 0.841 0.844 0.094 0.028 0.134 0.141 
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Table 6: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the change in operating earnings/assets (OE/A), 
the operating earnings growth, and the net income growth. The change in the OE/A variable is 
measured as the difference between the average annual OE/A of the three years post IPO and that of 
the three years pre IPO, adjusted by the specific industry median. The operating earnings (net 
income) growth variables are the growth rates of the operating earnings (net income) from the 
average annual operating earnings (net income) of the three years before the IPO year to that of the 
three years after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. The independent variables, 
measured at the year of the IPO, include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights 
(Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the 
wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger 
than zero, the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) 
equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry 
dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in OE/A Growth in operating earnings Growth in net income 
Const 8.433 15.849 -12.074*** -10.890** -13.698*** -12.369*** 
 (0.632) (0.380) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007) 
Cash -0.064** -0.063** 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.868) (0.640) (0.866) (0.871) 
Ex_wedge -0.084**  -0.031**  -0.037***  
 (0.043)  (0.018)  (0.004)  
Ex_dummy  -0.631  -0.486**  -0.575** 
  (0.474)  (0.035)  (0.011) 
LnAsset 0.655 0.335 0.656*** 0.586*** 0.769*** 0.695*** 
 (0.367) (0.635) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.025** -0.026** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.041) (0.029) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exchange 0.797 1.667 1.220*** 1.041** 1.533*** 1.380*** 
 (0.686) (0.408) (0.006) (0.022) (0.001) (0.002) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Adj. R
2
 0.784 0.774 0.090 0.060 0.142 0.116 
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Table7: Calendar-time market-adjusted performance 
 
The sample, which covers January 2002 to December 2008, comprises 138 non-state controlled 
IPOs whose largest shareholders have excess control rights and 120 non-state controlled IPOs 
whose largest shareholders have no excess control rights. We compile the monthly portfolios of IPO 
groups by including all issues undertaken in the three years previous to the month of observation. 
We then calculate average monthly excess returns for each calendar year, adjusting all common 
stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges (A shares and Growth Enterprise 
Market) by both equal and value weighting. Both the equally weighted and value weighted 
calendar-time portfolios are based on initial trading day market capitalization. p-values are in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Year 
IPOs with excess control rights IPOs without excess control rights 
Relative to EW  
market (percent) 
Relative to VW  
market (percent) 
Relative to EW  
market (percent) 
Relative to VW 
market (percent) 
Panel A: Equally weighted calendar-time portfolio 
2002 -0.28 -0.61 -0.97 -1.30 
2003 0.51 -1.03 -0.86 -2.40*** 
2004 0.01 0.03 0.84 0.86 
2005 1.04 0.65 1.94* 1.55 
2006 -1.37** -3.12* -0.96 -2.71 
2007 -4.42** -0.17 -3.81** 0.43 
2008 0.70 2.58 0.93 2.81 
Mean -0.56 -0.21 -0.37 -0.01 
Panel B: Value weighted calendar-time portfolio 
2002 -0.11 -0.44 -1.31 -1.64 
2003 0.40 -1.13* -0.81 -2.35** 
2004 -0.09 -0.07 1.14 1.16 
2005 1.22 0.83 1.90** 1.52 
2006 -0.83 -2.58 -0.88 -2.63 
2007 -5.21*** -0.96 -4.63** -0.38 
2008 0.07 1.95 0.75 2.64 
Mean -0.69* -0.34 -0.49 -0.13 
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Table 8: CAPM  and Fama and French (1992) three-factor regressions on 
calendar-time portfolio returns  
 
The sample, which covers January 2002 to December 2008, comprises 138 non-state controlled 
IPOs whose largest shareholders have excess control rights and 120 non-state controlled IPOs 
whose largest shareholders have no excess control rights. We compile the monthly portfolios of the 
IPO groups by including all issues undertaken in the three years previous to the month of the 
observation. Here, 
 
where  is the equally or value weighted return of these portfolios less the risk-free rate 
(monthly rate of one-year fixed term deposit rate from CSMAR ) and  is the value 
weighted market return on all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges (A shares and Growth Enterprise Market) minus the risk-free rate. SMB (small minus 
big) is the difference each month between the return on small and large capitalization firms; HML 
(high minus low) is the difference each month between the return of a portfolio containing high 
book-to-markets stocks and the return of a portfolio containing low book-to-market stocks. Both 
equally weighted and value weighted calendar-time portfolios are based on initial trading day 
market capitalization. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively  
 
 IPOs with excess control IPOs without excess control 
 CAPM Fama and French CAPM Fama and French 
 Equally 
weighted 
Value  
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value  
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value  
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value  
weighted 
Alpha -0.162 -0.281 -0.274 -0.301 0.017 -0.097 0.032 -0.155 
 (0.824) (0.684) (0.738) (0.710) (0.983) (0.900) (0.971) (0.864) 
RMRF 0.892*** 0.876*** 0.886*** 0.872*** 0.927*** 0.916*** 0.922*** 0.912*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SMB   0.472*** 0.303**   0.451*** 0.353** 
   (0.001) (0.029)   (0.004) (0.024) 
HML   0.084 0.066   0.109 0.069 
   (0.420) (0.520)   (0.338) (0.551) 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
adj. R
2
 0.626 0.643 0.669 0.657 0.611 0.608 0.646 0.625 
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Table 9: Logistical regressions on the likelihood of undertaking value-destroying 
related party transactions 
 
 In this table, the dependent variable is a value-destroying connected transactions dummy that 
equals one if the firm has undertaken a connected transaction associated with negative cumulative 
abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) over trading day window 
[0,+1],[-1,+1],[-2,+2],[-2,+5] relative to the announcement day (day 0). The sample includes a total 
of 4,106 related party transactions over 36 months for 244 IPO firms (35 months for 6 firms, 34 
months for 2 firms, and 33 months for 6 firms), starting from one month after the IPO month. We 
calculate the CARs based on daily market-adjusted stock returns and compute the market returns as 
the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock 
exchanges. The independent variables, measured at the year of the IPO, include the ultimately 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), 
and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger than zero. Also included are the 
debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one 
if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. p-values 
are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable  
=1 if CAR[0,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-1,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+2] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+5] <0 
Const 9.051*** 6.284*** 8.816*** 7.382*** 21.233*** 19.965*** 18.787*** 16.943*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ex_wedge 0.037***  0.020***  0.018***  0.027***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Ex_dummy  1.022***  0.842***  0.551***  0.748*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LnAsset -0.470*** -0.328*** -0.297*** -0.227*** -0.944*** -0.880*** -0.838*** -0.740*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.150) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235) (0.395) 
Exchange 0.414*** 0.517*** 0.766*** 0.737*** 1.212*** 1.241*** 0.965*** 1.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 
pseudo R
2
 0.116 0.132 0.100 0.115 0.157 0.161 0.168 0.176 
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Table 10: Mean and median statistics of initial returns 
 
This table reports mean and median statistics of the initial (first day) stock returns of non-state 
controlled IPOs grouped by whether or not the Chinese IPO firm is subject to excess shareholder 
control during 2002–2008.The initial return of an IPO is measured as the difference between the 
closing stock price on the first trading day and the offering price, and then divided by the offering 
price adjusted by market return.*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
   Market-adjusted initial returns (%)   
 Obs.  
Excess  
control > 0 
Excess  
control = 0 Difference 
p-value of 
mean  
difference 
p-value of 
median 
difference 
2002 12 Mean 113.85  139.28  -25.44  0.318 1.000 
Median 98.69  89.90  8.79  
2003 22 Mean 65.60  54.92  10.68  0.215 0.333 
Median 54.45  45.96  8.49  
2004 49 Mean 70.00  75.34  -5.34  0.392 0.836 
Median 60.24  52.00  8.24  
2005 8 Mean 30.49       
Median 27.35     
2006 34 Mean 91.88  97.06  -5.18  0.400 0.327 
Median 82.97  87.14  -4.17  
2007 75 Mean 178.07  235.59  -57.52*** 0.010 0.061 
Median 166.70  198.88  -32.19* 
2008 58 Mean 122.39  126.08  -3.69  0.441 0.931 
Median 28.38  33.43  -5.05  
Total  258 Mean 112.53  140.89  -28.35** 0.011 0.0867 
  Median 88.24  101.70  -13.46* 
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Table 11: GLS Regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the underpricing  
 
In this regression model, the dependent variables are the unadjusted initial return (FirstDayReturn) 
and the market-adjusted return (AdjustedFirstDayReturn). The independent variables are the 
ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash); the degree of excess control rights 
(Ex_wedge); a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger than zero.; and firm age (LnAge), 
represented by the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on 
which it was first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year). Also included are the 
natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates (LnDays); issue size, 
(LnIssueSize) represented by the natural logarithm of the number of shares issued; a dummy 
(Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and industry 
and year dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 First day return Adjusted first day return 
Constant 171.180**
* 
157.262**
* 
603.254**
* 
590.929**
* 
166.330**
* 
167.964**
* 
677.462**
* 
648.653**
* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash   0.123 0.165   0.042 -0.072 
   (0.610) (0.451)   (0.874) (0.734) 
Ex_wedge -1.118***  -0.556  -1.265***  -0.482  
 (0.000)  (0.119)  (0.000)  (0.193)  
Ex_dummy  -15.089*  -15.673*  -16.222*  -19.344** 
  (0.054)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.016) 
LnAge   -0.217 6.534   -0.284 12.198* 
   (0.978) (0.394)   (0.971) (0.096) 
LnDays   3.739 7.044   -1.398 -12.564 
   (0.852) (0.712)   (0.948) (0.552) 
LnIssueSize   -25.757**
* 
-27.129**
* 
  -28.519**
* 
-27.264**
* 
   (0.003) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Exchange   -23.232 -20.152   -24.754 -16.033 
   (0.185) (0.212)   (0.134) (0.303) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 
adj. R
2
 0.509 0.393 0.539 0.489 0.529 0.384 0.467 0.461 
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Figure 1: Mean post-IPO buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHRs) from 
one to 36 months after the initial trading month  
 
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Return over the market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Return over the market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
